UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2 IN RE: THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT 3 AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, 4 as representative of 5 3:17-BK-3283 (LTS) THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, 6 et al., 7 (Jointly Administrated) Debtors. ----x IN RE: THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT 8 & MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO 9 RICO, 10 as representative of 3:17-BK-4780 (LTS) 11 PUERTO RICO POWER AUTHORITY, 12 (Jointly Administrated) Debtor. 13 ----x 14 Motion Hearing December 20, 2017 15 8:40 a.m. 16 Before: 17 HON. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, 18 District Judge 19 HON. JUDITH G. DEIN, 20 Magistrate Judge 21 APPEARANCES 22 PROSKAUER ROSE LLP Attorneys for FOMB Oversight Board 23 BY: MARTIN J. BIENENSTOCK PAUL V. POSSINGER 24 TIMOTHY W. MUNGOVAN STEVEN RATNER 25

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THE DEPUTY CLERK: This case is In Re The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico as representatives of The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al., PROMESA Title III, 17 BK 3283-LTS.

JUDGE SWAIN: Again, good morning. And welcome to counsel, parties-in-interest, members of the public, and the press, those in San Juan, and those who are observing by telephone. We continue to have in mind and heart our fellow American citizens who are working to rebuild their lives on the Island of Puerto Rico and to rebuild the Island of Puerto Rico.

I remind you that consistent with Court and Judicial Conference policies and the orders that have been issued, there is to be no use of any electronic devices in the courtroom to communicate with any person, source or outside repository of information, nor to report any part of the proceeding.

So, all electronic devices must be turned off unless you're using a particular device to take notes or to refer to notes or documents that are already loaded on the device.

All audible signals, including vibration features, must be turned off. No recording or retransmission of the hearing is permitted by any person, including, but not limited to, the parties or the press. And anyone who is observed or otherwise found to have been texting, emailing, or otherwise communicating or recording with a device during the court proceeding will be subject to sanctions, including, but not

limited to, confiscation of the device and denial of future 1 2 requests to bring devices into the courtroom. 3 I would just remind counsel who are presenting to 4 speak from the podium into the microphone and project, so that 5 everything will be clear for everyone in all of the venues. 6 So, I would like to start by inviting Judge Houser, 7 the mediation team leader, to the podium to make a status 8 report. 9 JUDGE HOUSER: Good morning, Judge Swain. 10 JUDGE SWAIN: Good morning, Judge Houser. JUDGE HOUSER: I appreciate the opportunity to update 11 12 you and the other parties-in-interest on the work of the 13 mediation team on these Title III cases. 14 As I explained --15 JUDGE SWAIN: I'm sorry, one minute. 16 JUDGE HOUSER: No worries. 17 (Pause) 18 JUDGE SWAIN: Apologies to the people who are 19 listening by phone. I understand it's a little bit fuzzy, but 20 we're going to continue. And sorry for the interruption, Judge Houser. 21 22 JUDGE HOUSER: No worries. 23 As I explained to the parties-in-interest when I last 24 addressed the Court, a key component of our mediation process 25 is that the process is confidential. This will allow

parties-in-interest to have open and frank conversations with the mediators and with each other. By having these open and frank conversations, I believe we can find common ground that will assist us in the development of confirmable or substantially consensual plans of adjustment.

We have scheduled formal mediation sessions on certain of these disputed legal issues throughout the first quarter of 2018. Since the last time of these hearings, the mediation team has worked diligently to assist the parties in identifying these critical disputed legal issues that are in dispute among them, the resolution of which we hope, through settlement, will assist the parties in developing confirmable plans of adjustment in these cases.

As the parties know, the oversight board and AAFAF are in the process of developing new five-year fiscal plans for the commonwealth and certain other instrumentalities. Because the development of these new fiscal plans is important to all stakeholders in these cases, the mediation team is working with the parties to facilitate the development of these fiscal plans in as collaborative a process as possible prior to their anticipated certification by the oversight board in early 2018.

As I just mentioned, the mediation team will resume formal mediation sessions on critical disputed legal issues in dispute among the parties shortly after the new year. Parties have either submitted, or will be submitting, confidential

merits mediation statements to the mediators. These confidential merits mediation statements will allow the members of the mediation team to better understand the parties' positions on the legal and factual issues in dispute among them, so that we may assist them in attempting to negotiate a consensual resolution of these issues.

I have assigned various members of my mediation team to be responsible for particular issues based upon the various factors, including availability and expertise of a particular member or members of the mediation team.

To be sure, prehurricane, these cases presented enormously challenging debt restructures that I believe would require the cooperation, ingenuity, and diligence of all involved to accomplish. Hurricane Maria has added layers of complexity to the development of confirmable plans of adjustment in these cases. However, I remain highly confident that if the parties and the mediators continue to work together, and perhaps work together even more cooperatively in the new year, we will able be restructure the prepetition debt on a consensual or substantially consensual basis. The mediators remain committed to this goal.

As a point of personal privilege, I will share that Judge Ambro sent me a holiday card this year, and as you all know, Judge Ambro is a critical member of the mediation team.

And within that holiday card, his wishes for me -- I'm going to

expand because I know his wishes for all of us -- are 1 confirmable plans of adjustment in 2018. 2 3 You heard it here first. That is certainly the goal 4 of the mediation team, and who better to express it than our 5 Third Circuit Court of Appeals judge member of that team. 6 Judge Swain, thank you for the opportunity to update 7 you and other parties-in-interest on the work of the mediation 8 team in these cases. 9 JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you, Judge Houser. 10 And thanks to all of us for the dedicated work that 11 you and your team members are bringing to this effort. 12 JUDGE HOUSER: You're welcome. 13 JUDGE SWAIN: I would now invite the oversight board, 14 Mr. Bienenstock, to make a status report and just one moment. 15 One moment. 16 (Pause) 17 JUDGE SWAIN: The A/V specialist is here, so perhaps 18 we can have a little sound test before you get into the body of 19 the report. We're having that buzzing again. 20 (Pause) 21 JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you for your patience, 22 Mr. Bienenstock. 23 MR. BIENENSTOCK: Good morning, Judge Swain. Martin 24 Bienenstock, of Proskauer Rose LLP, as attorneys for the 25 Oversight Board for itself as Title III representative.

Our understanding is that the Court requested a status report on the bar date motion, which I will give, and I'm happy to answer any other questions that your Honor might have.

In respect of the bar date motion, on September 12, 2017, the oversight board filed it, and it was scheduled to be heard October 4. In the interim, between filing and the scheduled hearing, the board received comments from various parties having differing concerns turning on the types of their constituents, the mechanics, the need, et cetera.

Then on September 20, 2017, Hurricane Maria landed. On September 26th, the Court adjourned the October 4 omnibus hearing. And then on October 13, 2017, after consultation with AAFAF, and in consideration of the feedback from attorneys for the retiree committee, various unions, and other parties, and taking into account the conditions in the commonwealth, the oversight board determined it was in the best interests of all parties not to attempt to serve bar date notice and impose the burden on parties to complete the materials and have proofs of claims filed by what had been the proposed bar date. So the oversight board withdrew the bar date motion without prejudice.

Since withdrawing the motion, the oversight board continued to monitor conditions on the island. Now, our understanding, as of two days ago, is basically as follows:

The U.S. Postal Service is receiving mail and making deliveries directly to residences and businesses on the island where it is

safe to do so, and that's approximately 95 percent of the
island. Where USPS is unable to make the U.S. Postal
Service is unable to make direct deliveries, the residents and
businesses must collect mail at local post offices. However,
the postal service is not providing notification to residents
and businesses of pending mail in those instances. In four
towns, residents must travel to a different town to collect
mail at the nearest U.S. postal office.
JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Bienenstock, it seems the phone has
gotten disconnected, so we have to reconnect.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Sure.
(Pause)
JUDGE SWAIN: Ms. Ng, are we reconnected yet?
THE DEPUTY CLERK: Not just yet.
We're good.
JUDGE SWAIN: All right.
I understand that the Court Solutions line is now
reconnected. Mr. Brown, do you have someone
MR. BROWN: I'm waiting for a response.
JUDGE SWAIN: All right. So should we wait to begin
until you get that response?
MR. BROWN: Yes, I think we should wait a little bit
until we get a response.
JUDGE SWAIN: Okay.
MR. BROWN: We're good.

JUDGE SWAIN: All right, we're good.

I understand that the call dropped shortly after you began speaking, and, so, Mr. Bienenstock, I'm afraid I'm going to ask you to start from the top.

MR. BIENENSTOCK: Okay. Sure.

Your Honor, our understanding was that the Court desired a report on the bar date motion and -- which I will provide and certainly answer all other questions the Court might have.

Originally, the oversight board had filed the bar date motion on September 12th, and it was scheduled to be heard on October 4, 2017. The oversight board received comments from numerous groups of stakeholders in respect of the mechanics of bar date, the need for it, and methods of complying with filing proofs of claims by deadlines from different types of constituents. It went from retirees, on the one hand, having their particular issues, to holders of pieces of debt where there were agents, or indentured trustees or others who might be able to file on behalf of all holders.

So, we tried to take all of that into account and resolved, I think, mostly all the issues to our knowledge.

Then, on September 20, Hurricane Maria hit the commonwealth. On September 26, 2017, the Court adjourned the October 4 omnibus hearing for obvious reasons, and the bar date motion was also adjourned to November 15 by the Court's order

of September 29.

On October 13, after consultation with AAFAF and consideration of feedback from attorneys for the retiree committee, various unions, and other stakeholders, the oversight board determined it was in the best interests of all parties-in-interest not to attempt to serve the bar date notice and impose the burden on parties to complete the materials and have the proofs of claims filed by the proposed bar date.

Accordingly, the oversight board withdrew the bar date motion without prejudice.

Since then, the oversight board has continued for that reason, and many other reasons, to monitor conditions on the island, and our understanding, as of December 18, is that the U.S. Postal Service is receiving mail and making deliveries directly to residences and businesses on the island where it is safe to do so, and that now comprises approximately 95 percent of the island.

Where the postal service is unable to make direct deliveries, the residences and businesses must collect mail at local post offices. However, they do not get prior notification from the postal service that they have mail to pick up. In four towns, residents must still travel to a different town to collect mail at the nearest postal office, which could be up to approximately five miles away.

Taking all of that into account, and, also, the

oversight board is 100 percent in accord with Judge Ambro's wishes to Judge Houser and everyone else, that we reach confirmable plans, hopefully consensual ones, in 2018.

The oversight board currently contemplates the following timeline and procedures for what would be its second bar date motion:

We would file a new bar date motion that could be heard on February 7, 2018, at a scheduled omnibus hearing, with the bar date -- the proposed bar date to occur several months thereafter. It is -- we believe, based on what we know now, that that time frame will address all of the logistical hurdles that still remain.

The specifics are as follows: We would file the motion on January 16 or on or before January 16. On February 26, there would be a — if the Court grants the bar date motion, February 26 would be a deadline to serve the bar date notice, proof of claim form, and additional notices specified in the proposed order. May 28, 2018, would be the general bar date.

The proof of claim form will have Spanish translations on instructions. The proofs of claim may be filed in English or Spanish. And the methods of filing the proofs of claims would include the customary methods, first class mail, overnight courier, hand delivery, and electronic filing on Prime Clerk's website, and the oversight board is exploring

additional methods of filing with AAFAF and Prime Clerk to ease the burden on those creditors who would otherwise have problems doing it.

I wanted to emphasize that this is not a case where a bar date motion is being requested out of any type of gotcha game where if someone doesn't file, they don't get a distribution. It's being urged because it's very important, together with all the financial data, that we have an idea of the universe of claims and want to be sure that what we believe is the universe of claims is actually the universe of claims.

Your Honor, that's the end of my report. As I said,
I'm happy to answer any other questions your Honor might have.

asked you to make it at this time because people have been sort of doing do-it-yourself claim filings, and I am concerned that there be some accessible regularity of process, and that Prime Clerk be able to correlate claims filed through the Prime Clerk process with claims that are filed on the court website, and so — the ECF system, and so I am glad to hear that you are continuing to refine the process, and that it will be a process that is navigable in English and in Spanish.

And by way of comment as to the proposed bar date, I am glad to hear that you are contemplating leaving a substantial period of time. While we are all hopeful and encouraging of the plans for restoration of electricity to the

1	island and everything else, if it turns out that it's longer
2	than currently expected before telecommunications, and Internet
3	access, and mail access truly become easily navigable for
4	individuals, I will expect that you will think about whether
5	that period needs to be lengthened a bit longer
6	MR. BIENENSTOCK: Absolutely.
7	JUDGE SWAIN: and whether, even after the first
8	general distribution of notices, there are some other reminder
9	noticing procedures to make sure that people who might not have
10	been in communications at the time of the first wave of
11	noticing went out are made aware of what to do.
12	MR. BIENENSTOCK: Thank you, your Honor. We will add
13	reminder notices. I think that's a great idea.
14	JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you.
15	Are the timetables that have been announced for
16	revisitation of the physical plans still the relevant
17	timetables?
18	MR. BIENENSTOCK: They are the relevant timetables.
19	There have been requests for some modest extensions, and the
20	board is considering them.
21	JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you.
22	Those were my only further specific questions. If
23	there's anything else you'd like to share, it's your podium.
24	MR. BIENENSTOCK: Not at this time, your Honor. I

think other things will come up in the course of today's

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hearing. I don't want to duplicate. 1 2 JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you, Mr. Bienenstock. 3 So, the next matter on the agenda is the uncontested 4 matters section, which is cued up to begin with the GAM Realty 5 lift stay motion, and as to that, who is the speaker? 6 Who is speaking to the GAM lift stay motion as to 7 which there is a proposed consensual order? Well, I don't need a presentation. 8 The presentment 9 notice provided for objections by yesterday or the day before. 10 There have been none. I would have simply entered it, but it 11 was on the agenda, so the opportunity has been given. I will 12 simply take it on presentment and enter it. 13 Then I understand that one of the matters that had 14 been noticed up as a contested matter, the joint insurance 15 proceeds motion, has been resolved. So, shall we address that 16 now? 17 MR. HAYNES: Yes, your Honor. 18 JUDGE SWAIN: Please come to the podium. 19 MR. HAYNES: Good morning, your Honor. Nathan Haynes, 20 from Greenberg Trauriq, for AAFAF, as fiscal agent for PREPA. JUDGE SWAIN: Good morning, Mr. Haynes. 21 22 MR. HAYNES: Good morning. 23 Your Honor, this is a now uncontested joint motion 24 concerning the receipt of PREPA's insurance proceeds. 25 motion was filed jointly by AAFAF and the oversight board. The

purpose of the motion is to provide PREPA -- PREPA's property 1 insurance carriers with some comfort that they will not be 2 3 subject to double payment by making an advance under the 4 policy. 5 JUDGE SWAIN: Would you project just a bit more. 6 MR. HAYNES: Yes, your Honor. Thank you. 7 Thank you. JUDGE SWAIN: MR. HAYNES: Your Honor, I do have a short 8 9 presentation, but if your Honor has had the opportunity to 10 review the revised proposed order, I'm happy to be seated 11 unless you have questions. I'm also happy to run through it 12 shortly or quickly for you. 13 JUDGE SWAIN: I have reviewed all of the papers and 14 the revised proposed order. I have no particular questions or 15 concerns about the revised proposed order, and I understand how you got there and the concerns to which the revisions meant to 16 17 respond. And so, since you've confirmed now that there is no 18 further opposition to the order as proposed, I will take it on submission and enter it after this hearing. 19 20 MR. HAYNES: Thank you, your Honor. 21 JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you, Mr. Haynes. 22 I will now turn the bench over to Judge Dein for the 23 2004 motion.

JUDGE DEIN: Good morning, everyone here and in Puerto

I'm happy to have no one appear to argue this motion.

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Rico.

Am I that lucky, or are people actually going to argue this motion?

MS. MILLER: Good morning, Judge Dein. It's Atara
Miller, from Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy, on behalf of Ambac
Assurance Corporation.

I want to make a few brief comments, but I do hope that AAFAF will agree, at the end of this presentation, that we're going to continue to meet and confer, and, so, while I will make a very brief presentation, there may not be --

JUDGE DEIN: Half my wishes. Okay.

MS. MILLER: Your Honor, just this week, in response to AAFAF's disclosure on Monday morning of almost \$7 billion of cash of various government accounts, many of which cash balances were previously unknown to the public or inconsistent with numbers that had previously been disclosed, Jose Carrion, the chairman of the oversight board, said -- and I want to quote this because I think it should be the guiding principle in these cases, and particularly on these 2004 motions -- "It is essential that we improve the transparency and accountability of public finances to put Puerto Rico on the road to economic recovery, regain access to the capital markets, and restructure its immense debts."

Your Honor, we have been before you many times now on 2004 discovery motions where there has been consistent objection by both the commonwealth and the oversight board to

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pretty much anything the creditors are asking for. And, so, I'm quite pleased to be able to stand before you this morning and report that, as we were coming into court, AAFAF -- we, and AAFAF, and the oversight board had a very brief meet-and-confer where I think that the commonwealth has agreed to produce to Ambac many of the core pieces of data and financial information that we requested in this motion and that really are essential to understand not just what the current existing SUT cash position is, but what is really -- you know, what the breakdown of those numbers are, what the underlying basis is. There are some concerns about specific retailer information, which AAFAF can't provide pursuant to Puerto Rico law, and we're trying to figure out ways to get that information, so that creditors can really understand what the economic drivers on the SUT are and how to use that information and the numbers that we get to be able to project forward five years, ten years, fifteen years, and much longer out pursuant to the COFINA bonds.

So, I think that the best -- we haven't agreed on everything yet, and so I think our suggested proposal would be that we continue to meet and confer, and to the extent that the parties can't agree, or that there are outstanding disputes, that we raise them with your Honor outside -- in a conference outside of the omnibus hearings by motion. And we would like to target having a hearing, if possible, either in person in Boston or telephonically sometime in the first two weeks of

1	January, so that we can make sure that things are moving
2	forward.
3	JUDGE DEIN: Do you want a date for a status report to
4	me? Does that make sense?
5	MS. MILLER: I think that makes sense. January 3rd or
6	January 5th probably makes sense.
7	JUDGE DEIN: You have to write it, so I don't care
8	whether it's the 3rd or the 5th, but why don't I just say the
9	5th and submit a status report. You can say you're still
10	talking, but at least I'll have some idea what's going on
11	there.
12	MS. MILLER: Great.
13	JUDGE DEIN: And I expect that we can certainly make
14	time for a hearing sometime in that time frame, in the
15	beginning of January.
16	Do you want to be heard?
17	MS. MILLER: Thank you, your Honor.
18	MR. CANTOR: Thank you, your Honor. Daniel Cantor,
19	O'Melveny & Myers, on behalf of AAFAF.
20	I'm pleased to hear Ms. Miller's approach. We think
21	it's the right approach. We think it's, quite frankly, the
22	approach that should have been taken all along rather than
23	going forward with the motion.
24	But in the spirit of cooperation, I will limit my
25	remarks to saving that we look forward to meeting and

conferring with Ambac and any other interested parties to try and reach a consensual resolution. Transparency is a good thing, but it is not such an overriding interest, that it strips the government of its rightful powers and responsibilities.

Thank you, your Honor.

JUDGE DEIN: I'll accept those dates on a status

report, and then I'll be available for hearing, if necessary.

The process, it seems to me, is starting to really work, and I think that's great. I think the requests should be more specific, I think the responses need to be more directly responsive, and we all have our legal positions, and now we have to deal with more concrete requests and production of documents. So, I think that's terrific.

Before I get into any more trouble, I will sit down unless anybody has anything else to say.

There we go.

JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you, Judge Dein. I'm back.

The final action item on our agenda is the contested stipulation enforcement motion of the Puerto Rico funds. And, so, I understand that Mr. Cunningham intends to open with 12 minutes of argument?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes.

Good morning, your Honor.

JUDGE SWAIN: Good morning.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: John Cunningham, of White & Case, on behalf of the Puerto Rico funds.

Your Honor, we are here this morning on the motion of Puerto Rico funds to condition ERS's automatic stay on a continuation of adequate protection for ERS's bondholders or, alternatively, to enforce the parties' July 14 joint stipulation approved by this Court.

One housekeeping matter, your Honor: The agenda letter filed by the oversight board and AAFAF did not include listing our reply that we did file on December 16th. That's Docket No. 28. I alerted them to that. I just make note of that, your Honor.

JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you. And I have reviewed all of the filings.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Thank you.

So, by way of background, your Honor, my clients, the Puerto Rico funds, hold approximately 720 million of the 3 billion of ERS bonds. The Puerto Rico funds, your Honor, are also Puerto Rico-based funds with on-island resident shareholders, many of whom are retirees and other individuals who rely on the fund's monthly dividends to meet their basic living expenses.

Last Wednesday, your Honor held a hearing on summary judgment regarding the ERS bondholders' liens. We were jointly -- joint parties with Jones Day and their clients on

that matter. Mr. Bennett argued that. Your Honor took the matter under advisement. We have absolutely no issue with that, your Honor.

The issue today with this motion is interim adequate protection. My clients in the ERS bondholder group, represented by Mr. Bennett, argued for certain interim adequate protection in the joint stipulation. As the Court will recall, that bargain was hard-fought. The fight between the ERS bondholders, and the commonwealth, and AAFAF over adequate protection date back over a year ago before Judge Besosa and, ultimately, before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit earlier this year recognized rights of ERS bondholders to adequate protection, which led to the joint stipulated orders entered by Judge Besosa.

When this Title III case was filed, AAFAF again refused adequate protection to ERS bondholders. The original adequate protection motion was filed which the ERS bondholders in May. Your Honor held a June 28th hearing on that motion in San Juan and urged the parties to negotiate, and, ultimately, that led to the joint stipulation.

Your Honor, the joint stipulation has two key features. First is a path forward procedurally to resolve AAFAF's lien challenges that led to a declaratory relief action by ERS, agreed discovery and briefing schedule on summary judgment motions, and an October 31st summary judgment hearing

scheduled, but subjected to the Court's schedule, but most important for today's purposes, it provided adequate protection for -- for ERS bondholders in two forms. The first is monthly deposits of 18-1/2 million dollars from June to October and a postpetition segregated account for the benefit of ERS bondholders; and, two, the continued payment of monthly interest to ERS bondholders from the prepetition segregated account established by Judge Besosa's orders.

Equally important, your Honor, the joint stipulation had two express safety valves for ERS bondholders. The first was even though the 18-1/2 million postpetition costs ended on October 1st, paragraph (c) provided rights of the ERS bondholders to renew their request for adequate protection with this Court, quote, on or after October 31st, 2017.

And secondly, paragraph (f) provided that monthly deposits to the fiscal agent for the payment of interest on the ERS bonds in accordance with the ERS bond resolutions would continue until this Court's ruling on the summary judgment motions.

Fast forward from the Court's approval of the July joint stipulation to today. Puerto Rico is hit with Hurricanes Maria and Irma in September. The parties were embroiled in discovery disputes in the adversary proceeding, and the Court, this Court, rescheduled a summary judgment hearing from October 31st to December 13th. But that schedule triggered the

two safety valves in paragraphs (c) and (f) of the joint stipulation.

First, it was optional for ERS bondholders at that time to seek and renew further adequate protection requests as to the \$18-1/2 million deposits, which did end on October 31, but, secondly, there was a mandatory provision that ERS was required to continue depositing monthly interest from the prepetition segregated account, quote, for payment of interest on the ERS bonds until the Court's summary judgment ruling. That means November interest gets paid, and it was, and December interest is to get paid, and that has not happened because ERS failed to comply with paragraph (f) and deposit those monies, so that the interest could be paid.

Your Honor, after the November interest was paid and just three days prior to paragraph (f)'s November 20th deadline for ERS to deposit its December interest payment, AAFAF sent a stay violation notice to the Fiscal Agent Bank of New York on November 20 demanding return of the November interest payment, which it had already paid to BONY, which BONY had already paid the bondholders in accordance with paragraph (f) and the ERS bond resolutions.

AAFAF also failed to, as I pointed out, make the November 20th payment of the December interest with the fiscal agent as required by paragraph (f). So, faced with no continuing 18-1/2 million monthly deposits and no further

interest payments, your Honor, we were left with no choice but to file this motion. Every attempt and offer to AAFAF and the board to resolve this motion has been flatly rejected.

In opposing the motion, AAFAF and the board failed to meet their burden of showing adequate protection of the ERS bondholders' liens and engaged in a contorted reading of the joint stipulation that simply ignores its plain language.

First, as set forth in the original adequate protection motion, Section 362(d) does apply in this Title III case, and, specifically, it provides a court shall grant relief from the automatic stay, including conditioning such stay, if cause exists, including lack of adequate protection. Section 362(g) places the burden of proof on adequate protection squarely on AAFAF and the board, and they failed to meet that burden. They claim that the interest payments from June to October, plus 92 million in the postpetition segregated account, are sufficient adequate protection. They state at paragraph 1 of their opposition, "No additional payments are necessary to ensure the bondholders' purported security interests are adequately protected pending the Court's decision on summary judgment."

But they intentionally ignore the continuing harm to ERS bondholders caused by the diversion of employer contributions away from ERS to a new PayGo system established by the commonwealth as of June 1st. Providing us no continuing

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adequate protection is, per se, lack of adequate protection.

Paragraph (f) of the joint stipulation provided for continued monthly payments until the Court's summary judgment ruling.

That much is clear.

In short, the diminution of value of the bondholders' pledged properties by continuing to divert employer contributions away from ERS to the commonwealth's PayGo system is the harm that we are apparently suffering, and it requires continued adequate protection under Section 362(d).

Second, your Honor, AAFAF and the board argue that paragraph (d) of the joint stipulation overrides paragraph (f) when it provides interest on the ERS bonds shall be paid through the interest payment date on October 1st, 2017. They argue at paragraph 4 of the opposition that paragraph (f) does not require or authorize any payments to the bondholders and, instead, stayed the procedure for how ERS must transfer funds to BONY for a specified period of time. That's clearly wrong. It ignores the plain language of paragraph (f) that says that the monthly deposits with BONY until the summary judgment ruling by this Court is for the payment of interest on the ERS bonds in accordance with the ERS bond resolutions. paragraph (f) is virtually identical to language borrowed from Judge Besosa's April stipulated order, pursuant to which monthly interest was being deposited and paid by BONY to ERS bondholders, and AAFAF and the board have never argued that

such language was a procedural language that didn't authorize payment to the bondholders.

Also, as BONY points out in their response letter to AAFAF's state violation letter, ERS bond resolution expressly referenced in paragraph (f) requires BONY to pay out interest once those interest payments are received, not to hold it awaiting further instruction from ERS.

Finally, their reading of paragraph (f) makes no logical sense since it would simply transfer funds from one restricted segregated account into another account that's restricted being held at BONY. There's no benefit to the ERS bondholders with that type of arrangement.

So, your Honor, why -- we ask, also, if this was a payment procedure, why was the November interest payment deposited, but the December interest payment wasn't deposited. They talked out of both sides of their mouth.

JUDGE SWAIN: May I?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes.

JUDGE SWAIN: Since time is getting short, I would like you to address whether you have a different view of the contractual commitment with respect to the 18 million five as to which there were specific payment dates, and there is a sentence at the end of paragraph 4.

(Continued on next page)

MR. CUNNINGHAM: No dispute, your Honor. It ended, those payments, deposits ended October 31, and we would have to, similar to this motion, come back and request your Honor to resume that.

JUDGE SWAIN: And do you consider yourselves to have requested that or be requesting that by way of queuing this as a renewal of the adequate protection motion?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Correct, correct.

JUDGE SWAIN: And do you have any comments as to the interaction between Section 305 of PROMESA and 362 (d), to the extent you are asking me to impose a non-consensual requirement of payment of funds?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Understood, your Honor. I recognize that your Honor's not likely to require them to make the payment, but then the stay should be lifted.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: To allow us to exercise whatever our rights are to enforce our claims. If they're going to get the benefit of the stay, they need to provide adequate protection. If they're not going to provide adequate protection, the stay should be lifted. It is the same position we were in when we were before your Honor on June 28th.

JUDGE SWAIN: We didn't talk too specifically about 305 on June 28th, and so that issue did come into sharper focus later with the PREPA bondholders' motion to lift the stay, and

305 does have very broad language about direct and indirect interference with revenues and with the exercise of governmental powers, and we also talked at that time about 306 and exclusive jurisdiction over debtor property.

So that is why I am pressing you on what it would mean to lift the automatic stay and why that wouldn't be a 305 problem, too?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: I understand. I do not expect your Honor will force them to pay the 18 and a half million dollars. Instead, you can condition the stay on them doing it if they don't lift the stay.

Alternatively, your Honor, going to your point, we did ask if your Honor was not inclined to do that, if you could at least enforce the joint stipulation which your Honor did approve and retain jurisdiction to enforce, and that would be continued monthly interest payments.

JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you. Before you sit down, I have a couple of other questions.

So in your most recent revised proposed order, you incorporated some nomenclature changes requested by Bank of New York. You also incorporated a specific, I gather, composite interest number and an exculpatory provision for the Bank of New York. So, first, as to the number, is it your representation, are you making a representation as to the derivation of that number, please?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: First of all, by way of background, your response which is pari passu with each other so it is not subordinated in senior. We do have 85 percent of the mark current interest bonds, and 15 percent of them are capital depreciation or zero percent interest bonds.

This was an issue a raised with the Jones Day group with us with respect to our motion because interest was being paid out with current interest bondholders. There was a concern about the effect of that on holders of capital depreciation bonds which are not entitled to current interest.

For the purposes of adequate protection, our request was to not increase the interest payment, but to allow a sharing of that payment to go radically between holders of current interest bonds and capital depreciation bonds based on a decretal value for capital depreciation bonds. We had our respective financial advisories and BONY work out that schedule, so that is kind of the math that was put together and is the result of that proposed form of order.

JUDGE SWAIN: And so the payments up to now had only been distributed to the CIB --

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes.

JUDGE SWAIN: -- bondholders, and so --

MR. CUNNINGHAM: That's correct.

JUDGE SWAIN: -- so it would be spread among all the

bondholders?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes, going forward, for whatever payments beginning with the December payment, yes, your Honor.

JUDGE SWAIN: And the 27 million and change number for I think you called it December-January was calculated by reference to the interest rates that are on the schedule that you attached to the proposed order?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Correct. It was the same 13.9 million that was always going to be paid. We are not asking for more interest to come out of the segregated account.

JUDGE SWAIN: What is the legal authority for the proposed release of the fiscal agent and whom did you intend to bind by that?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: We borrowed that language from your Honor's interpleader BONY decision when they interpleaded COFINA monies and they wanted protection. This is an adequate protection payment as opposed to actual payments being made pursuant to the ERS bond resolutions or dictated by those terms because right now the caps are not entitled to be paid current interest.

The fact they would be sharing certain interest payments on board, that is an adequate protection feature, and they want a recognition they're complying with your Honor's order and that is being deemed adequate protection as opposed to payments directly under the bond resolution. They don't provide for payment of current interest right now to the caps.

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JUDGE SWAIN: So that's intended to protect she bank as against the universe of bondholders particularly CIB bondholders who might have an issue with that and between you and Mr. Bennett's firm, who represents some substantial portion of those bondholders, but not all of them, I assume. MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes, we have clearly more than a majority, but we don't have a hundred percent of those. JUDGE SWAIN: And it is also intended to preclude the debtor from any further contention that the November payment or about irregularity of whatever payment arrangements are made with respect to the distributions to the bondholders? MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes. If your Honor grants our interpretation of the joint stipulation, we believe there is no stay violation. JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you. MR. CUNNINGHAM: Thank vou. JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Friedman. MR. FRIEDMAN: Good morning, your Honor, Peter

MR. FRIEDMAN: Good morning, your Honor, Peter Friedman from O'Melvany & Myers. So I wanted to mention Luis Galasso, administrator of ERS, is in the San Juan courtroom.

Your Honor, so we think as an initial matter we argued all along adequate protection is not appropriate at all aside from the stipulation. I will get to the stipulation in a moment. Under cases like Hunts Pier and rights, there is a serious dispute as to the validity of means.

The court doesn't need to grant adequate protection, and we believe after all the arguments you have heard at least at this time, the motion should be denied without prejudice, on the grounds there remain continuing issues with respect to the validity of the liens; and, therefore, no adequate protection is necessary right now until the summary judgment determination is made.

We also continue to believe the combination of 305 and the bar on the court issuing orders with respect to government property as well as the 305 decision impacted by the government's PREPA ruling would also bar relief from the automatic stay.

As a practical matter, we're still a little bit perplexed as to how cash payments, putting aside the stipulation, are actually adequate protection. Adequate protection is supposed to protect payers against diminution in the value of their collateral. The collateral isn't diminution in value; it is a segregated account that can't be touched. ERS is not using that collateral; therefore, that collateral can't be diminishing in value. To us paying it out doesn't add to their adequate protection. It is nice to have a cash payment, but there is no reason to compel a cash payment.

With respect to the \$18.5 million monthly deposits, it is conceded or not impacted by the stipulation. First of all, as the retiree committee noted, all of this relates to the

PayGo issue and whether it is appropriate for the commonwealth to have implemented the PayGo matter. Frankly, therefore, we don't think payments or dealing with adequate protection — dealing with payments, adequate protection payments regarding PayGo is appropriate. There is a completely separate adversary proceeding with respect to PayGo, where Altair is the plaintiff.

We submitted a motion to dismiss. An opposition is due this week. That will be argued at some point. That deals with PayGo and whether the conversion to PayGo is appropriate. Taking by conversion of PayGo, the automatic stay bars the commonwealth from implementing PayGo.

Those issues are dealt with there. It is not appropriate to deal with a remedy for PayGo in this context.

Now, we also think -- and if we're actually right about PayGo, they're not entitled to any adequate protection because none of the employer contributions actually belong to them.

In addition, your Honor, we point to the segregated \$92 million post-petition is providing ample adequate protection for the time period before the summary judgment motion is determined.

I want to focus on the stipulation because I think that is where a lot of the discussion we just heard was focused on. What you don't hear is as important as what you do hear. What you didn't hear is that Paragraph C of the stipulation

defines the term "briefing period" to which payments are supposed to be made by reference to a schedule. That language was not referenced in the presentation you just heard.

The language, "briefing period" shall mean the date hereof include, and including the date the court renders a ruling with respect to the parties' motions for summary judgment on the declaratory relief action in accordance with Schedule 1, defined term the briefing period.

When you look at Schedule 1, Schedule 1 actually has a specific date.

JUDGE SWAIN: It doesn't have a specific date for the court to resolve the summary judgment motions. It has a specific target date for argument on the summary judgment motions, but the definition of "briefing period" includes the resolution of the summary judgment motion, so how do the specific dates in Schedule 1 help you to constrain the date on which I decide, and obviously I think everyone understands it is not my practice to let grass grow under my feet, but I also won't be bound by a specific resolution.

MR. FRIEDMAN: No, your Honor.

I think the parties were bound with the decision being keyed off an argument on 10-31-2017. When that didn't -- not an open-ended -- if the briefing period runs through 2018 or 2019 that we have to keep paying adequate protection, that we agreed to an adequate protection payment based on an

understanding of when everything that the parties had under their control would end, and that is why a reference to Schedule 1 is in there.

If it were solely the end of the briefing period and then the point in which the point the court reached a decision, there would be no reason to reference Schedule 1. It would say Schedule 1 or any dates extended by the parties thereafter, or it wouldn't just say Schedule 1. The word "Schedule 1" and the dates of a highly compressed schedule have to be meaningful, and what I proposed is to provide understanding what the parties agreed to. We would pay adequate protection for the parties to do everything they could on 10-31.

Your Honor, we also think that our reading of the stipulation gives full meaning to Paragraph D. The opposing side's reading of the stipulation just completely eviscerates Paragraph D, it renders it complete surplusage, which I think we cited statutory canons, the contractual interpretation canons you're not supposed to do that. There is literally no meaning to that paragraph if Paragraph F requires continued payments to go on forever. That is not an appropriate way to read a court stipulation which I think really should be interpreted as a contract.

JUDGE SWAIN: Well, isn't it logical to read Paragraph

D as recognizing that in view of the schedule in Schedule 1,

there was certainty absent some other global settlement, that

the interest payments for the period through October 1 would have to be made because the briefing schedule would still be going on, and then Paragraph F has the more conceptual, open-ended mechanism tied to the briefing schedule as being the ultimate determinant of the length of time for which additional payments would have to be made.

So it doesn't seem to me that the reading of F as giving content to an ongoing obligation necessarily subsumes or de-voids of meaning Paragraph D.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, I think for that to be the right reading, you would just have the provisions in Paragraph F in Paragraph D. Paragraph D would say payment shall be made through the end of the briefing period as opposed to having a date certain on which they ended, and another provision which says something, which says, I think directly interpreted, that you need to make a subsequent monthly payment because if you make the October 1st payment and then you tee up money to give to BNY in case it is necessary.

One potential interpretation of the stipulation, the right stipulation, but at least one potential stipulation, reading of the stipulation if the court were to conclude we are not a hundred percent right, you have a continuing obligation to make transfers of money to BNY under Paragraph F, but we don't need to make the payments because payments are governed by Paragraph D. That would make sense.

JUDGE SWAIN: The language of Paragraph F as to pre-October 31 interest transfers and the quote-unquote briefing period interest transfers is the same. In both cases they're barely parallel sentences with slight difference in wording, but the key wording seems to be the same that ERS shall cause money to be transferred, "for the payment of interest on the ERS bonds in amounts necessary to pay interest," and so if one was meant to be optional and just moving a debt chair from one side of the book to the other, but leaving the debt chairs in that protected environment, why would there be the "shall" and "for the payment of interest" and necessary language in both of those sentences?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, again I think it is there to at most permit or require the ERS to make the payments to BNY so that if the court, say, goes into overtime, right, post-October 31, and then issues an order, that order can be complied with immediately.

If the court were to order we must continue to pay adequate protection under some theory, whether it is contractual or noncontractual, what would happen is ERS wouldn't have to take intermediate steps. BNY would immediately comply with that rather having to go through a multi-step process to avoid the situation where money continues to go out the door after the time period in which we contractually agreed and have to go chasing after bondholders

because interest payments are made after those set forth in Paragraph D, the best way to harmonize the obligations under Paragraphs D and F.

JUDGE SWAIN: I have a couple of -- well, finish your presentation and I will ask questions.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor refreshed my recollection.

Paragraph F is a requirement to make very specific deals with the requirement to make the payment to BNY on the 20th of the month rather than specific payment to bondholders that come due the first of the month. That is why it really is a mechanical provision of transfer, and that is why you have to have a separate paragraph as opposed to Paragraph D which deals solely with the payment of the monies transferred to F.

Sequentially, it might make sense to make Paragraph F to D so you have the mechanics of getting the money out to BNY first and the money out the door later. That is why we think Paragraph F is mechanical.

I don't know if you want me to address any of the questions you addressed to Mr. Cunningham. Look, if we are wrong and BNY was authorized to make payments, it is a little hard for me to argue it, that we should set up a cause of action to BNY for having done something presently permitted to do under the court order.

Likewise, if my understanding of the stipulation is correct, under the revised order is correct, it does not

increase our obligation, I don't think I have an issue. I probably would like to have a chance to look at it in more detail in the revised form of order to see if in any way, by making a smaller interest payment to current, people currently entitled to payments and making a larger payment to CABS somehow changes the calculation of people's claims; for example, people can assert because they got paid less interest, now they have interest on top of interest in terms of calculating the size of their claim, I don't know the answer to that.

I want to be able to speak to our financial advisers if the court is inclined to go down that road through requiring payments. I don't think it is appropriate for the parties to stipulate to something that increases ERS's liability. If it is purely an issue that relates to inter-creditor allocations and will have no impact on the overall liability of ERS, we would not have an objection. If it in any way increases the liability by deferring interest payments made to people required to receive current interest payments, we are not okay with that. Is that clear?

JUDGE SWAIN: Yes. Thank you. So that subsumes both the inclusion of the CABS and any nomenclature issues with the revised proposed order. If I decide that that contractual obligation to pay interest is ongoing, you're asking for an opportunity to review and consult on fine-tuning the proposed

order?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, or perhaps the other side will agree no way that increases the size of anybody's claim, it has no impact on the size of their claims, that would also be an acceptable resolution. Thank your Honor.

JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you.

JUDGE SWAIN: Mr. Gordon.

MR. GORDON: Good morning, your Honor. Robert Gordon of Jenner & Block.

JUDGE SWAIN: Good morning.

MR. GORDON: Adequate protection is obtainable in bankruptcy only under limited circumstances, and that makes sense because a creditor seeking adequate protection payments essentially is seeking to jump ahead of other creditors and carve out monies from the debtor's precious cash flows ahead of other creditors.

The bondholders referred to two pre-Title III adequate protection stipulations, and I would submit it was completely irrelevant. Those were not entered by this Court in a Title III case. They were not entered through a bankruptcy regime. They were not entered with participation of the collective interest of creditors. The only thing that is relevant is whether the parties are entitled to adequate protection under the -- (inaudible) -- I would say they are not at least to date.

To be entitled to adequate protection, the creditor must, there must be at least two things that are established:

One is that the creditor has a lien in an asset of the debtor; and, number two, the asset is diminishing in value as a result of the automatic stay. Neither of those elements have been established to date. The bondholders would have this court treat them as if it already established both things, and that is not appropriate.

If the alleged collateral we are focusing on is, for example, pre-petition account, both ERS and the retiree committee have disputed that the bondholders have a lien in that cash, and that was the subject of the arguments last week before this Court. So it has not yet been established they even have a lien in that cash.

In addition, there is no ability to establish that that cash is diminishing, as Mr. Friedman in his papers has indicated, that account remains intact. To the extent monies have been taken out of that account, they have only been transferred to the bondholders.

If the collateral in question is the post-petition account, as Mr. Friedman has indicated in his papers, that account has not been disturbed at all. In fact, it has grown to 92 and a half million dollars over time, so it is not diminishing in value.

The bondholders also argue throughout their papers

that they have a lien in post-petition payments by municipal entities central government under the PayGo system. Both the retiree committee and the ERS strongly dispute that issue, and as Mr. Friedman has indicated, that is a matter being dealt with in a separate adversary proceeding.

But if the bondholders are correct on that argument, they are essentially saying they have a lien in a perpetual, recurring, robust revenue stream, which leads to intellectual conclusions. One, there can be no meaningful diminishing in the value of the collateral. It is recurring. Two, if it is true, the bondholders are over-secured. Under the bankruptcy code, an over-secured creditor is not entitled to adequate protection payments at all.

Pending a determination of the bondholders' lien rights, the normal course of action in a bankruptcy case would be to escrow any adequate protection payments, and that was essentially what this Court suggested in the June 28th hearing. For reasons unknown to the retiree committee, however, a joint stipulation was submitted to the court without being passed by the retiree committee that actually provided for payments, outright payments to the bondholders pending this determination.

The retiree committee filed the reservation of rights without any determination of predicates for adequate protection. The bondholders actually received \$55.5 million.

They were receiving adequate protection payments before it has been determined they're even entitled to adequate protection payments.

I guess we are here today to say that enough is enough. As to the November 1 interest payment that is being argued about here, I would say this: It is a red herring. The bottom line is that both ERS and BNY acted erroneously. ERS should never have transferred the money to BNY Mellon on October 20th because the stipulation clearly indicates that they're only entitled to interest payments through October, and BNY Mellon should have asked, when it received the payment with the transferred monies, whether there was supposed to be an interest payment on November 1 because they clearly under the stipulation are not entitled to interest payment on November 1. They both acted erroneously, in my opinion.

That does not create rights that don't exist under the stipulation, to argue that the stipulation by any plain reading does not, is not perpetually, not self-executing after October 31. Arguments to the contrary lift partial language segments and quote them out of context, as Mr. Friedman also indicated. The stipulation itself does not provide a basis for adequate protection payments beyond October.

For the reasons I have already stated, the factual circumstances in law do not provide a basis for continuing adequate protection payments. There simply is no established

1 basis at this time. Accordingly, your Honor, we ask that the bondholder motion be denied. Thank you. 2 3 JUDGE SWAIN: Our specialist is coming back again, so 4 let's take -- here he is. The buzzing came back again over 5 while the last speaker was speaking. 6 (Pause) 7 JUDGE SWAIN: The phone line is clear. Is the court 8 reporter able to do his job when the buzzing is audible in 9 here? 10 THE REPORTER: Sometimes. JUDGE SWAIN: Let's all be as clear as we can in 11 12 speaking. Mr. Court Reporter, if you need to stop the speaker 13 and ask for something to be repeated, please do so. 14 understand everybody else. 15 LAW CLERK: The phone line just cut out. JUDGE SWAIN: Let's just take, I'll call it a 16 17 five-minute break, which is a break that people come back from 18 as quickly as possible while the phone is being sorted out and I'll continue. 19 20 (Recess) 21 JUDGE SWAIN: Please be seated. 22 I understand that Mr. Schaffer from Bank of New York 23 wishes to be heard. 24 MR. SCHAFFER: Your Honor, Eric Schaffer from Reed 25 Smith for Bank of New York Mellon. There are three points I

would like to make quickly:

First, we are the fiscal agent under the resolution that binds ERS as well as us, and we have a limited administrative role. We receive funds from ERS, and on the dates determined by the resolution, we are required to make payments to the bond owners. Consistent with the resolution, we have no liability for performing that duty. Absent direction from the court, we would perform our limited duties solely under the resolution in the ordinary course;

The second point is a response to adequate protection.

JUDGE SWAIN: Please project into the microphone.

Thank you.

MR. SCHAFFER: Yes, your Honor.

Second, with regard to adequate protection, following up on some of the court's questions, the resolution does not provide for payments on the capital appreciation bonds, the CABS but, of course, the court could order that as adequate protection. If the court does do so, we would need clear direction with regard to our role and responsibility, clarity with regard to each security. The revised form of order would do just that.

Of course, the form of order would depart from the terms of the resolution, and that's why it is important to have what you referred to as the exculpatory language. That ensures that we are not exposed to liability, whether to CABS or anyone

else, for complying for the court's order on adequate protection.

The last point, your Honor, is responding to what I believe are misstatements that have been made in the papers or in arguments. We are not a party to the stipulation. I think that since the opposition was filed by ERS, counsel for FOMB has confirmed that it was negotiated without our involvement and it was presented without our knowledge.

Consistent with the resolution, your Honor, we received funds on October 18th. We made a distribution on November 1. There was no requirement that we receive or request some sort of second confirmation. Again, we are not party to the stipulation and we don't have a duty to police the ERS or to ask do you really, really want to make this payment.

What happened is that on November 17, 30 days after we received the payment, 16 days after it was distributed as required under the resolution, we received a letter telling us that ERS thought distribution was improper. We understand that ERS may regret having sent the monies, but there is no basis to blame the fiscal agent for acting in accordance with the resolution. There is no basis to impose additional duties.

Your Honor, I believe you have seen the letter that we sent?

JUDGE SWAIN: Yes, I have.

MR. SCHAFFER: I don't think I have to add anything to

that. I just conclude we simply performed our administrative functions in accordance with the resolution.

Thank you, your Honor.

JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you, Mr. Schaffer. And now, Mr. Cunningham, you're back.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Thank you, your Honor.

In brief reply, the first thing I would like to say is during the break I had a chance to talk with my client. I want to clarify one thing. Your Honor, if your Honor were to enforce the joint stipulation on the monthly interest payments the way we ask your Honor to do, we would withdraw our request without prejudice as to the 18 and a half million dollar post-petition deposits so we don't have to get into the 305 arguments. Basically our alternative relief would be the leave we are asking for today if your Honor were to grant it.

With respect to FOMB arguments, the first is one how can cash payments constitute adequate protection. I would note Bankruptcy Code Section 361 entitled, "Adequate protection in Subsection 1," specifically says cash payments or periodic cash payments can be adequate protection.

Secondly, on the Schedule 1 point, your Honor was spot-on. Schedule 1, which I have in front of me, says as to deadline, the last deadline of October 31, 2017 was with respect to a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, but specifically says subject to the court's schedule. So there

was no firm deadline either as to the October 31 hearing or certainly this Court's summary judgment ruling which no party would know when your Honor would render that ruling. There is no firm deadline, as they argue in their papers.

The last point about Paragraph F being mechanical because it requires monthly interest deposits with BONY on the 20th of each month preceding the payment date, this is mechanical only because it helps BONY to actually get ready to make the payment on the 1st of each month. This is, as I said, carryover language identically from Judge Besosa's order entered in April of 2017.

So this isn't something new we invented. This is a mechanical feature to address the feature when BONY receives the payment, it needs to prepare and transfer and make the interest payments on the 1st. Otherwise, the language was always consistent, they still needed to make the payment.

If, as the retiree committee, your Honor, counsel suggested we're right in our arguments, then we are over-secured creditors not entitled to adequate protection. Your Honor, the Commonwealth of FOMB and the oversight board argued that very point to the First Circuit in January, and the First Circuit found we were entitled to adequate protection and remanded this back to Judge Besosa which, of course, led to the stipulated orders we had through Title III which are, of course, relevant to the issue of adequate protection because it

framed the issue starting with the first circumstance, Judge
Besosa leading up to the Title III cases. That framed the
joint stipulation, and that is where the mechanism of continued
monthly payments arises, and we ask it just continue as
provided in the stipulation.

JUDGE SWAIN: Thank you.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Thank your Honor.

JUDGE SWAIN: If you will all bear with me for just a moment while I reflect, I will rule on this. (Pause)

I have reviewed carefully the written submissions of all of the parties and listened carefully to the arguments made in court today. The court will now rule on the bondholders' motion. This oral opinion constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law for the purposes of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.

The court has jurisdiction of this contested matter pursuant to Section 306 of PROMESA. The bondholders have acknowledged with respect to the obligations of ERS under the stipulation that the contractual obligation relating to additional payments of \$18.5 million per month expired, and the bondholders have withdrawn their request for continuation of that payment schedule further as a matter of adequate protection, and so I turn to the provisions of the joint stipulation regarding interest-related transfers of

pre-petition funds.

As to that, the court finds that the joint stipulation is more open-ended and that reading Paragraphs C, D and F of the stipulation together, the court concludes that ERS agreed to continue to make such transfers in accordance with the schedule and mechanics set forth in Paragraph F through the briefing period as defined in the stipulation which ends upon the court's resolution of the summary judgment motions.

The court rejects as unfounded in the text of the joint stipulation ERS's contention that such transfers and/or distributions to bondholders of amounts transferred after October 1, 2017 were optional. Rather, ERS remains obligated through the briefing period to transfer to BNY Mellon as fiscal agent "for the payment of interest on the ERS bonds," and then I again quote, "the amount necessary to pay interest on the ERS bonds due and payable on the first day of the next succeeding month in accordance with the ERS bond resolutions."

And so it is an obligation to transfer the monies in aid of distribution of those interest payments to bondholders.

One moment. (Pause)

So all arguments and objections having been considered and either withdrawn or overruled, to the extent consistent with this oral ruling, the ERS bondholders' motion is granted to the extent that ERS must continue to transfer monies calculated by reference to interest payments in accordance with

Paragraph F of the joint stipulation during the briefing period, and BNY Mellon is to distribute such monies to bondholders. The motion is denied in all other respects.

I am directing the parties to confer regarding the form of order since there are issues with respect to recipients of the distributions, the nomenclature and the issues that BNY Mellon has raised, and those I think require some further processing and exploration on at least FOMB's part.

So I would like you to confer and present to me by the 27th of December an agreed form of order, or if no agreed form of order is achieved, then a further revised proposed order with objections accompanying that submission of the order so that I can consider and then determine the form of order to enter. Are there any questions about that procedure?

Very well, then. Thank you all very much.

There are several matters that have been carried over for the February Omni, and we will be reconvening for oral argument on January 10th of pending motions. Is there anything further that we need to take up together this morning?

Seeing no hands raised, I thank you all and I wish you happy and safe holidays and safe travels for those who are traveling, and again our best wishes and thoughts are with our colleagues and the people of Puerto Rico on the island.

Good morning.

(Court adjourned)

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT)) ss. 2 OF PUERTO RICO 3 4 5 6 REPORTERS' CERTIFICATE 7 8 We, Andrew Walker and Jerome Harrison, do hereby 9 certify that the above and foregoing, consisting of the 10 preceding 54 pages, constitutes a true and accurate transcript of our stenographic notes and is a full, true and complete 11 12 transcript of the proceedings to the best of our ability. 13 Dated this 20th day of December, 2017. S/Andrew Walker _____ 14 15 S/Jerome Harrison _____ Andrew Walker, RMR, CSR, RPR, CRR 16 17 Jerome Harrison, CP, CM, CSR, CRR 18 Official Court Reporters 19 500 Pearl Street 20 New York, NY 10007 21 212-805-0320 22 23 24 25